CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Ms. Tanu Bedi, Advocate as Amicus Curiae appointed by Litigation
Cell, Punjab and Haryana High Court assisted by Mr. Pushp Jain,
Advocate and Mr. Akhil Dadwal, Advocate.
Mr. Tushar Tanwar, Advocate and
Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate for the respondent –contemnor.
ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL, J.
This criminal original contempt petition has been listed after suo
motu notice had been taken by the Single Bench with regard to the averments of
the respondent in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
2. The respondent, while preferring the petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C., had stated that the Judicial Magistrate is not inclined to pass an order
but is only inclined to give adjournments and the respondent is being harassed
by the action of the Judicial Magistrate. The Single Bench had referred to the
zimni orders passed by the Court of JMIC which indicated that the matter had
been adjourned at the request of the counsel for the respondent and, therefore, it
took suo motu notice for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings. The order
of the Single Bench dated 12.10.2023 is reproduced hereunder:-
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“The present petition has been filed under Section 482
Cr.P.C. seeking issuance of direction to the learned Sub-Divisional
Judicial Magistrate. Dera Bassi to expedite the hearing of CRM481/2022 filed by the petitioner on 12.12.2022 and with a further
prayer seeking direction to learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Dera Bassi to decide the above mentioned case on the
next date of hearing i.e. 18.11.2023 or on any earlier date.
A perusal of the contents of the petition would show that in
para No. 2, the petitioner has apparently alleged allegations
against the learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dera
Bassi, wherein it has been so stated that the learned Sub-Divisional
Judicial Magistrate, Dera Bassi is not inclined to pass an order but
is only inclined to give adjournment. Thereafter, in para No.4 it is
stated that the petitioner is being harassed by the actions of the
learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dera Bassi.
However, a perusal of the orders passed by the learned SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate, Dera Bassi, which have been
annexed with the present petition would show that on 15.07.2023,
which is about three months ago only, the report of the Station
House Officer was received on an application under Section 156
Cr.P.C. and on the request of learned counsel for the
complainant/applicant i.e. petitioner herein, the matter was
adjourned to 22.08.2023 for consideration. Thereafter on
22.08.2023, on the request of learned counsel for the complainantpetitioner, the matter was again adjourned to 16.09.2023 for
consideration. Thereafter on 16.09.2023 again, the matter was
adjourned to 07.10.2023 for consideration on the request of learned
counsel for the complainant-petitioner and now the said matter is
posted for hearing on 18.11.2023. During the course of arguments,
learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on 07.10.2023,
the file was not available with the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Dera Bassi and the matter was heard but instead of
passing an order the same was adjourned to 18.11.2023.
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This Court after perusing the contents of the petition, the
orders passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate,
Dera Bassi and hearing the submissions made by learned counsel
for the petitioner is of prima facie view at this stage to consider as
to why not appropriate proceedings be initiated against the
petitioner in accordance with law. Therefore, notice is issued to the
petitioner to show cause as to why criminal contempt proceedings
be not initiated against him for making such allegations against the
learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dera Bassi, which is
not supported by the record.
The petitioner is directed to be present in Court on the next
date of hearing.
Adjourned to 14.11.2023.”
3. On 14.11.2023 as the explanation of the respondent was not found
proper, the Single Bench directed the initiation of proceedings of criminal
contempt and thereafter, CROCP was listed before the Division Bench.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent
had legitimately sought recourse to judicial remedy under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
and his pleadings would not amount to criminal contempt. He also submitted
that the respondent has filed his affidavit offering unconditional apology for any
lapse on his part and, therefore, the contempt proceedings be dropped.
5. Learned counsel for Amicus Curiae submitted that the conduct of
the respondent in the light of the law pertaining to contempt of Court would not
constitute criminal contempt and in support of her submission has referred to the
judgements of the Supreme Court in the cases of Andre Paul Terence Ambard
vs. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, (1936) 1 All ER 704,
Brahma Parkash Sharma and others vs. State of UP (1953) 1 SCC 813, Shri
Baradakanta Mishra vs. The Registrar of Orissa High Court and another,
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(1974) 1 SCC 374, RE S. Mulgaokar (1978) 3 SCC 339, P. N. Duda vs. P.
Shiv Shanker and others (1988) 3 SCC 167, RE Harijai Singh and another
RE Vijay Kumar (1996) 6 SCC 466, Hari Singh Nagra and others vs. Kapil
Sibal and others (2010) 7 SCC 502, Sanjoy Narayan, Editor-in-Chief,
Hindustan Times and others vs. High Court of Allahabad (2011) 13 SCC
155, Chairman, West Bengal Administrative Tribunal and another vs. S. K.
Monobbor Hossain and another (2012) 11 SCC 761 and T. C. Gupta and
another vs. Hari Om Parkash and others (2013) 10 SCC 658.
6. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines contempt of
Court, Civil contempt, criminal contempt and High Court. The relevant extract
of Section 2 is reproduced hereunder:
2(a) “contempt of Court” means civil contempt
or criminal contempt;
(b) ‘civil contempt” means wilful disobedience
to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to
a court;
(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the
doing of any other act whatsoever which – (i) scandalises or
tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority
of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to
interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends
to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;
(d) “High Court” means the High Court for a
State or a Union territory, and includes the court of the
Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory.”
7. It would be apposite to refer to Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts
Act which is reproduced hereunder:
“6. Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts
when not contempt. –
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A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court in respect of
any statement made by him in good faith concerning the presiding
officer of any subordinate court to –
(a) Any other subordinate court, or
(b)The High Court to which it is subordinate.”
8. From a bare reference to Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts
Act, it is apparent that publication would be necessary to constitute an act of
criminal contempt. The publication could be by words, spoken or written signs
or any other representation or otherwise. The publication should amount to
scandalizing or tend to scandalizing or to lowering the authority of the Court or
it interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or in
the administration of justice.
9. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘publication’ is ‘the act of
making something known to public’. In Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, it is stipulated that a statement made in good faith concerning the presiding
officer of a Court shall not hold the person to be guilty of contempt.
10. We may now refer to the judgments cited by the learned Amicus
Curiae. In Andre Paul Terence Ambard’s case (supra), wherein an article had
been published under the title ‘Human Element’ discussing judgments in two
cases of attempt to murder. In one case, where there was no injury, a sentence of
08 years had been awarded while in the second case involving a murderous
attack on a woman with a razor which had seriously mutilated her, a sentence of
07 years had been imposed. It was stated in the article that one judge was
habitually severe and another habitually lenient. The privy council, however, did
not punish the contemnor for contempt of Court and held that the path of
criticism is a public way where the wrong-headed are permitted to err provided
the members of public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking
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part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising the powers of
criticism. It was also held that justice is not a cloistered virtue. She must be
allowed to suffer scrutiny and outspoken comments of ordinary men. The
relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:
“xxxxx
Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a
Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his
authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of
contempt. Further, any act done or writing published
calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of
justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of
Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord
Hardwicke L. C. characterised as ‘scandalising a Court or a
judge’. In re Read and Huggonson (1). That description of
that class of contempt is to be taken subject to one and an
important qualification. Judges and Courts are alike open to
criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is
offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the
public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt
of Court. xxxxxxxx But whether the authority and position of
an individual Judge or the due administration of justice is
concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the
public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good
faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of
justice. The path of criticism is a public way : the wrong
headed are permitted to err therein : provided that members
of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to
those taking part in the administration of justice, and are
genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in
malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice,
they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue : she must
be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though
outspoken comments of ordinary men.
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In the present case, the writer had taken for his theme
the perennial topic of inequality of sentences under the text ”
The Human Element” using as the occasion for his article the
two sentences that were passed by two Judges of a particular
Court, and pointed out that sentences did vary in apparently
similar circumstances with the habit of mind of the particular
Judge and that the human element entered into the awarding
of punishment, and the writer had expressly disclaimed the
suggestion that one of the said Judges was habitually severe
or the other habitually lenient.
XXXXXX
The writer is, however, perfectly justified in
pointing out what was obvious and inevitable, namely, the
part which the human element in a particular Judge plays in
the award of sentences by him and that the writer therefore
was not guilty of any contempt of Court in respect of what he
wrote. Some very conscientious Judges have thought it their
duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary sentences and
others equally conscientious have thought it their duty to
view the same crimes with leniency, and if to say that the
human element enters into the awarding of sentences be
contempt of Court, few in or put of the profession would
escape.”
11. In Brahma Prakash Sharma’s case (supra), the members of the
District Bar Association were being proceeded for contempt as they had passed
resolutions against two judicial officers and forwarded the copies to the District
Magistrate. It was stated in the resolution that the officers were thoroughly
incompetent in law, did not inspire confidence in judicial work, were stating
wrong facts while passing orders, were over bearing and discourteous to the
litigant public and the lawyers alike. It was also mentioned that one of the
Judges allowed the Court Reader to record evidence, he was short tempered and
frequently threatened lawyers to initiate proceedings for Court of contempt. The
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Supreme Court had held that the action of the petitioner therein did not amount
to contempt of Court. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced
hereunder:
“xxxx
13. It seems, therefore, that there are two
primary considerations which should weigh with the court
when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in
cases of contempt committed by “scandalising” the court
itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or
character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his
judicial duties, would not be contempt if such reflection if
made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable
criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public
acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism
that confidence in courts can be created. “The path of
criticism”, said Lord Atkin –“ is a public way. The wrong –
headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of
the public abstain from imputing motives to exercising a right
of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempt to impair the
administration of justice, they are immune.”
14. In the second place, when attacks or comments are
made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and
derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to
distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what
amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement
is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not
necessarily make it a contempt. The distinction between a
libel and a contempt was pointed out by a Committee of the
Privy Council, to which a reference was made by the
Secretary of State in 1892. A man in the Bahama Islands, in a
letter published in a colonial newspaper criticized the Chief
Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen language
which was sarcastic and pungent. There was a veiled
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insinuation that he was an incompetent judge and a shirker of
work and the writer suggested in a way that it would be a
providential thing if he were to die. A strong Board
constituting of 11 members reported that the letter
complained of. though it might have been made the subject of
proceedings for libel, was not, in the circumstances.
calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or
the due administration of the law and therefore did not
constitute a contempt of court. The same principle was
reiterated by Lord Atkin in the case of Debi Prasad Sharma v.
King Emperor referred to above. It was followed and
approved of by the High Court of Australia in R. v. Nicholls,
and has been accepted as sound by this Court in Bathina
Ramakrishna reddy v. State of Madras. The position
therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel
so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him
to proceed against the libeller in a proper action if he so
chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging
statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of
justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can
be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to
the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the
public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an
apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the
integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and
prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the
court’s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause
embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the
discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is
not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an
actual interference with the administration of justice by
reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is
likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper
administration of law.”
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12. In the case of Shri Baradakanta Mishra (supra) a judicial officer,
who was facing disciplinary proceedings, had made remarks against the Judges
of the High Court and the Chief Justice in his petition to the Governor. In his
defence, he had stated that remarks do not pertain to the judicial functions of a
Judge and, therefore, would not constitute contempt. However, the Supreme
Court had held that these remarks amount to vilification of the Judges and are
mala fide and would constitute contempt of Court. However, a lenient view was
taken and instead of sentence of imprisonment, fine was imposed. The relevant
extract thereof is reproduced hereunder:-
“Scandalization of the court is a species of contempt and may take
several forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge.
When proceedings in contempt are taken for such vilification the
question which the court has to ask is whether the vilification is of
the Judge, as a Judge. (See Queen v. Gray) or it is the vilification of
the Judge as an individual. If the latter, the Judge, is left to his
private remedies and the court has no power to commit for
contempt. If the former, the court will proceed to exercise the
jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court will have also to
consider the degree of harm caused as affecting administration of
justice and, if it is slight and beneath notice, courts will not punish
for contempt. This salutary practice, is adopted by section 13 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The jurisdiction is not intended to
uphold the personal dignity of the Judges. That must rest on surer
foundations. Judges rely on their conduct itself to be its own
vindication.”
13. We may also refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in RE S.
Mulgaonkar’s case (supra) wherein an article was published in a newspaper
mentioning incorrect facts while commenting on Supreme Court Judges. The
Registrar of the Supreme Court wrote to the Editor pointing out the mistake but
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instead of publishing correction, the whole material in his possession was
published which contained objectionable material. The Supreme Court, however,
did not punish the contemnor for contempt. It also referred to the famous quote
of Voltaire that “I do not agree with the word you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it.” It held that the judiciary should adopt a
magnanimous charitable attitude even when utterly uncharitable and unfair
criticism is made out of bona fide concern for its improvement. Relevant extract
is reproduced hereunder:
“Xxxx.
The judiciary cannot be immune from criticism. But,
when that criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross
mis-statement and made in a manner which seems designed
to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy public
confidence in it, it cannot be ignored. I am not one of those
who thinks that an action for contempt of Court, which is
discretionary, should be frequently or lightly taken. But, at
the same time, I do not think that we should abstain from
using this weapon even when its use is needed to correct
standards of behavior in a grossly and repeatedly erring
quarter. It may be better in many cases for the judiciary to
adopt a magnanimously charitable attitude even when utterly
uncharitable and unfair criticism of its operations is made out
of bona fide concern for improvement. But, when there
appears some scheme and a design to bring about results
which must damage confidence in our judicial system and
demoralize Judges of the highest court by making malicious
attacks, anyone interested in maintaining high standards of
fearless, impartial, and unbending justice will feel perturbed.
I sincerely hope that my own undisguised perturbation at
what has been taking place recently is unnecessary, One may
be able to live in a world of yogic detachment when
unjustified abuses are hurled at one’s self personally, but,
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when the question is of injury to an institution, such as the
highest Court of justice in the land, one cannot overlook its
effects upon national honour and prestige in the comity of
nations. Indeed, it becomes a matter deserving consideration
of all serious minded people who are interested in seeing that
democracy does not flounder or fail in our country. If fearless
and impartial courts of justice are the bulwark of a healthy
democracy, confidence in them cannot be permitted to be
impaired by malicious attacks upon them. However, as we
have not proceeded further in this case, I do not think that it
would be fair to characterize anything written or said in the
Indian Express as really malicious or ill-intentioned and I do
not do so. We have recorded no decision on that although the
possible constructions on what was written there have been
indicated above.”
14. In P.N. Duda’s case (supra), the respondent, who was the Minister
of Law and former Judge of the High Court, had made remarks in his speech
implying partiality by the Supreme Court towards the economically affluent
section of the Society. The Supreme Court held that the action does not amount
to contempt of Court and that in a free market place of ideas, criticisms about the
judicial system should be welcomed as long as it does not impair or hamper the
administration of justice. The relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:-
“9. Justice is not a cloistered virtue. She must be allowed to suffer
the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of
ordinary men.” – said Lord Atkin in Ambard v. AttorneyGeneral for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C. 322 at 335.
Administration of justice and Judges are open to public criticism
and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society
and their accountability must be judged by their conscience and
oath of their office, that is, to defend and uphold the Constitution
and the laws without fear and favour. This the Judges must do in
the light given to them to determine what is right. And again as has
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been said in the famous speech of Abraham Lincoln in 1865 “With
malice towards none, with charity for all, we must strive to do the
right, in the light given to us to determine that right.” Any criticism
about the judicial system or the Judges which hampers the
administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective
approach of Judges and brings administration of justice into ridicule
must be prevented. The Contempt of Court proceedings arise out of
that attempt. Judgment can be criticised; the motives of the Judges
need not be attributed, it brings the administration of justice into
deep disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice is one of the
pillars through which democratic institution functions and sustains.
In the free market place of ideas criticisms about the judicial system
or Judges should be welcomed, so long as such criticisms do not
impair or hamper the administration of justice. This is how Courts
should approach the powers vested in them as Judges to punish a
person for an alleged contempt, be it by taking notice of the matter
suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a lawyer.
xxxx
17. Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964,
[1965] 1 SCR 413 observed as follows:
“We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt,
large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with
circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in
anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of
the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never
forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their
office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of
their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their
approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they
observe in their judicial conduct.”
18. It has been well said that if judges decay, the contempt
power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that
Judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion, per Krishna
Iyer, J. in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar of Orissa
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High Court and another, [1974] 1 S.C.C. 374. It has to be admitted
frankly and fairly that there has been erosion of faith in the dignity
of the court and in the majesty of law and that has been caused not
so much by the scandalising remarks made by politicians or
ministers but the inability of the courts of law to deliver quick and
substantial justice to the needy. Many today suffer from remedyless
evils which courts of justice are incompetent to deal with. Justice
cries in silence for long, far too long. The procedural wrangle is
eroding the faith in our justice system. It is a criticism which the
Judges and lawyers must make about themselves. We must turn the
search light inward. At the same time we cannot be oblivious of the
attempts made to decry or denigrate the judicial process, if it is
seriously done. This question was examined in Rama Dayal
Markarha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 497 where it
was held that fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a
public document or which is a public act of a Judge concerned with
administration of justice would not constitute contempt. In fact such
fair and reasonable criticism must be encouraged because after all
no one, much less Judges, can claim infallibility. Such a criticism
may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect or an error has been
committed both with regard to law or established facts. But when it
is said that the Judges had a pre-disposition to convict or
deliberately took a turn in discussion of evidence because he had
already made up his mind to convict the accused, or has a wayward
bend of mind, is attributing motives, lack of dispassionate and
objective approach and analysis and pre-judging of the issues which
would bring administration of justice into ridicule. Criticism of the
Judges would attract greater attention than others and such criticism
sometime interferes with the administration of justice and that must
be judged by the yardstick whether it brings the administration of
justice into a ridicule or hampers administration of justice. After all
it cannot be denied that pre-disposition or subtle prejudice or
unconscious prejudice or what in Indian language is called
“Sanskar” are inarticulate major premises in decision making
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process. That element in the decision making process cannot be
denied, it should be taken note of.
xxxxx
30. Bearing in mind the trend in the law of contempt as noticed
before, as well as some of the decisions noticed by Krishna Iyer, J. S.
Mulgaokar’s case (supra) the speech of the Minister read in its proper
perspective, did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute
or impair administration of justice. In some portions of the speech the
language used could have been avoided by the Minister having the
background of being a former Judge of the High Court. The Minister
perhaps could have achieved his purpose by making his language mild
but his facts deadly. With these observations, it must be held that there
was no imminent danger of interference with the administration of
justice, nor of bringing a institution into disrepute. In that view it must
be held that the Minister was not guilty of contempt of this Court.”
15. In RE Harijai Singh and RE Vijay Kumar’s case (supra), an
article was published in the newspaper wherein it was stated that sons of the
Chief Justice of India were beneficiaries of allotment of petrol pumps in
discretionary quota. The information was found to be false. However, the
Supreme Court accepted the apology of the journalist while observing that he
had acted in a gross-carelessness to publish the article without confirming the
contents thereof. It was observed that the Courts should not be hyper-sensitive in
dealing with the contempt matters. Relevant extract of the judgment is
reproduced hereunder:-
“12. But it may be pointed out that various judgments and
pronouncements of this Court, bear testimony to the fact that this
Court is not hypersensitive in matters relating to contempt of Courts
and has always shown magnanimity in accepting the apology on
being satisfied that the error made in the publication was without
any malice or without any intention of dis-respect towards the
Courts or towards any member of judiciary. This Court has always
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entertained fair criticism of the judgments and orders or about the
person of a Judge. Fair criticism within the parameters of law is
always welcome in a democratic system.” xxxxx
16. In the case of Hari Singh Nagra and others versus Kapil Sibal
and others (supra), the respondent, who is a Senior Advocate, had written an
article published in a newspaper, which was critical of the judiciary. The
Supreme Court held that mere criticism of the judiciary would not constitute
contempt unless it hampers the administration of justice or brings administration
of justice into ridicule. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-
“21. There is no manner of doubt that Judges are accountable to the
society and their accountability must be judged by their conscience
and oath of their office. Any criticism about the judicial system or
the judges which hampers the administration of justice or brings
administration of justice into ridicule must be prevented. The
contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt. National
interest requires that all criticisms of the judiciary must be strictly
rational and sober and proceed from the highest motives without
being coloured by any partisan spirit or tactics.”
17. In the case of Sanjay Narayan, Editor in Chief Hindustan Times
and others versus High Court of Allahabad (supra), the newspaper report had
been published which sought to tarnish the image of the Chief Justice of the
High Court based on conjectures and not on facts and figures. The unconditional
apology was accepted by holding that the Courts should be magnanimous. It
was also directed that the apology be published on the first page of the
newspaper. The relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:-
“11. The judiciary also must be magnanimous in accepting an
apology when filed through an affidavit duly sworn, conveying
remorse for such publication. This indicates that they have accepted
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their mistake and fault. This Court has also time and again
reiterated that this Court is not hypersensitive in matter relating
to Contempt of Courts Act and has always shown magnanimity in
accepting the apology. Therefore, we accept the aforesaid
unqualified apology submitted by them and drop the proceeding.
12. With the aforesaid observations, we order for closure of the
proceedings initiated against the appellants herein under the
Contempt of Courts Act by keeping the affidavit filed by the
appellants on record with a direction to the appellants to publish the
apology as stated in the affidavit in the first page of Lucknow
edition of Hindustan Times to be published on 01.09.2011 and also
at such other place, wherever there was any such publication, in a
daily issue of the newspaper at some prominent place of the
newspaper.”
18. In the case of Chairman, West Bengal, Administrative Tribunal
and another versus S.K. Monobbor Hossain and another (supra), the
contemnors had passed remarks against members of the State Administrative
Tribunal which led to the initiation of the contempt proceedings. The Supreme
Court held that while exercising the powers of contempt, the Courts must not be
hypersensitive or swung by emotions but must act judiciously. The relevant
extract is reproduced hereunder:-
“9. The tenor of the dicta on this topic is crystal clear. This Court
has, again and again, asserted that the contempt jurisdiction enjoyed
by the courts is only for the purpose of upholding the majesty of the
judicial system that exists. While exercising this power, the courts
must not be hypersensitive or swung by emotions, but must act
judiciously. Reference made to Dinabandhu Sahu vs. Orissa this
Court very pertinently observed that:
2…… it is no part of the judicial function to be vindictive or
allow any personal or other considerations to enter in the
discharge of its functions…..”
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19. In the case of T.C.Gupta and another versus Hari Om Parkash
and others (supra), incorrect information was furnished to the High Court which
led to initiation of criminal contempt proceedings. Instead of providing
information with regard to those landowners whose land was released without
filing objections as sought by the High Court, the details of the landowners, who
had filed objections and their land had been released, were stated. The Supreme
Court had held that the power to punish for contempt is a rare species of a
judicial power to be exercised with due care and caution. The unqualified
apology of the appellant was accepted. The relevant extract is reproduced
hereunder:-
“That the power to punish for contempt is a rare specie of judicial
power which by the very nature calls for exercise with great care
and caution had been reiterated by this Court in Perspective
Publications (P) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra whereas
in In re: S. Mulgaokar, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer while noticing the
principles of the exercise of power of contempt had outlined the
first of such principles to be “wise economy of the use of the
contempt power by the court”. Reiteration of the aforesaid principle
has been made in several subsequent pronouncements of this Court,
reference to which would not be necessary in view of the unanimity
of opinion on the issue that the power to punish for contempt ought
to be exercised only where “silence is no longer an option.”
20. In the case of State of U.P. versus Association of Retired
Supreme Court and High Court Judges at Allahabad and others, 2024 (3)
SCC(1), the Supreme Court had set aside the order of the High Court which held
that the action of the respondents in not complying with the order of the Court
and filing an application for recalling of the order amounted to criminal
contempt. The Supreme Court held that criminal contempt cannot be initiated
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against the party for availing legal remedies and raising a legal challenge to an
order. The relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:-
“33. In our considered opinion, however, even the standard for civil
contempt was not met in the facts of the present case. In a
consistent line of precedent, this Court has held that while initiating
proceedings of contempt of court, the court must act with great
circumspection. It is only when there is a clear case of
contemptuous conduct that the alleged contemnor must be
punished. The power of the High Courts to initiate contempt
proceedings cannot be used to obstruct parties or their counsel from
availing legal remedies.
34. In the present case, the State of Uttar Pradesh was availing its
legitimate remedy of filing a recall application. From a perusal of
the record, it appears that the application was filed in a bona fide
manner. Not only had the Finance Department raised its concerns
regarding the competence of the Chief Justice before the High
Court but its previous conduct, including file notings of the
department and letters to the Central Government, indicate that this
objection had been raised by them in the past. The legal position
taken by the Government in the recall application was evidently
based on their desire to avail their legal remedy and not to willfully
disobey the first impugned order.
35. The objections raised by the Government of Uttar Pradesh with
regard to legal obstacles in complying with the First Impugned
Order were never adjudicated by the High Court. Instead, the High
Court regarded the objection as an attempt to obstruct justice,
without even a cursory attempt to provide reasons. Applying the
standards delineated above, it is clear that the actions of the
government of Uttar Pradesh did not constitute even ‘civil
contempt’ let alone ‘criminal contempt’. The circumstances most
definitely did not warrant the High Court acting in haste, by
directing that the officials present before the court be taken into
custody. This summary procedure although, permitted under
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Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be invoked as a
matter of routine and is reserved for only extraordinary
circumstances.
36. Such summary procedure, as has been held by this Court, in
Leila David v. State of Maharashtra, 8 can only be invoked in
exceptional cases, such as instances where:
“36. ….after being given an opportunity to explain
their conduct, not only have the contemnors shown no
remorse for their unseemly behavior, but they have
gone even further by filing a fresh writ petition in
which apart from repeating the scandalous remarks
made earlier, certain new dimensions in the use of
unseemly and intemperate language have been resorted
to further denigrate and scandalize and overawe the
Court. This is one of such cases where no leniency can
be shown as the contemnors have taken the liberal
attitude shown to them by the Court as license for
indulging in indecorous behavior and making
scandalous allegations not only against the judiciary
but those holding the highest positions in the country.”
No such situation prevailed in the present case. Therefore, the
invocation of criminal contempt and taking the government
officials into custody was not warranted.”
21. We now proceed to examine the case against the respondent in the
light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as to whether his action would
constitute criminal contempt. The respondent had preferred a petition before the
Judicial Magistrate and was aggrieved by the delay in its disposal. He thereafter
sought the remedy which was available to him under Cr.P.C. and approached
this Court by preferring a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking a direction
to the Judicial Magistrate for expeditious disposal of the case. He has stated that
the Magistrate is not inclined to decide the case and inclined to adjourn the case
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and he has been harassed by the actions of the Magistrate. What appears to have
led to the initiation of proceedings is that the perusal of the zimni orders
manifested that the adjournments were being sought mostly by the counsel of the
respondent. It is true that the respondent ought to have been more circumspect
while approaching this Court and pleaded the factual matrix in consonance with
the record. He ought not to have casually stated something which is not borne
out from the record or is factually incorrect. However, we cannot lose sight of
the fact that the respondent is one among many citizens who have approached
the Court seeking redressal of their grievances. The dockets of the Courts are
clogged and often cases are not decided speedily or as speedily as expected by
the litigant. The respondent appears to be a hapless citizen who is awaiting
justice at the portals of the District Court and in these circumstances he appears
to have transgressed by not setting out the correct factual backdrop. However,
we do not find that the action of the respondent would amount to contempt of
Court.
22. It is significant to note that the averments made by the respondent
concerning a judicial officer in his petition would not amount to contempt of
Court as in terms of Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the statement
pertaining to a presiding officer of a Court does not amount to Criminal
contempt provided it is in good faith. Good faith has been defined in Section 3
(22) of the General Clauses Act, wherein it is stated that “the thing shall be
deemed to be done in good faith where it is done honestly whether it is done
negligently or not”. The pleadings in the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
do not suggest that they are malafide or not in good faith. The pleadings could
have been better worded but it is difficult to arrive at the conclusion that they
were malafide. The respondent was only seeking expeditious disposal of his
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case. If we were to be oversensitive to the pleadings it would deter an ordinary
citizen to approach the Court for redressal of his grievance. The increase in
litigation in recent times indicates that not only people are more aware of their
rights but they have enormous faith in the justice delivery system. If the litigant
does not state the true facts of the case or tries to mislead the Court, then the
relief sought can be declined or he/she be burdened with costs. The contempt
jurisdiction should not be exercised lightly at the drop of a hat. It ought to be
invoked only in rare or exceptional cases where there is interference with
administration of justice or such action amounts to scandalizing or lowering the
authority of the Court. The respondent appears to be a hapless citizen who is
awaiting speedy justice at the portals of the District Court. The Courts ought to
encourage the citizens to knock its doors to ventilate their grievances and seek
justice which would be in consonance with its endeavour towards inclusive
justice.
23. We may hasten to add that healthy and constructive criticism
should always be welcome. The judgments of the Court are in public domain
and open to discussions and critical analysis. Judges are not super humans and
do commit mistakes. Dialogue and debate are the hallmark of a democracy
governed by rule of law. Suggestions towards improvement in the administration
of justice should always be taken with gratitude.
24. Furthermore, the respondent has furnished his unqualified and
unconditional apology. In his affidavit, he has stated that he undertakes that he
will not use any contemptuous words/language in future and would abide by all
the conditions imposed by the Court.
25. In the aforenoted facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the
considered view that the action of the respondent does not constitute criminal
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contempt of Court. Consequently, the criminal contempt proceedings stand
dropped.
(ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL)
JUDGE
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE
PRONOUNCED ON:01.07.2024
SwarnjitS
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes / No
Whether reportable : Yes / No
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