J U D G M E N T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
1. Leave granted.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
2. These appeals arise out of three separate suits. For
convenience, we are referring to the parties with reference to
their status in Original Suit No. 12091 of 2010 (Civil Suit no.
331 of 1996). The appellant is the plaintiff in the said suit. The
respondents in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19060 of 2014 are
the defendants in the said suit.
3. It is not in dispute that one Sungani Bai (Sukri Bai) was
the original owner of the suit property who died in the year
1947. Sungani Bai (the original owner) executed a registered
settlement deed dated 1st December 1945. She settled the suit
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property by the said settlement deed in favour of three persons:
Gopu Bai, Abbey Karan Joshi and Vijay Kishan Bohra. It is not
in dispute that the original owner died intestate without leaving
any legal representatives. As per the settlement deed, it was
provided that 1/3rd share in the suit property was given to
Gobu Bai for her life and then to her two daughters for their
lifetime. It was provided that after their demise, 1/3rd of the
share would pass on to their male children. The daughters of
Gobu Bai died, leaving behind them Radhe Shyam, Rajendra
Purohit and Omprakash Purohit. As per the settlement deed,
1/3rd share was given to Abbey Karan Joshi during his lifetime
and after his demise to his male children. The 2nd defendant –
Sailesh Joshi, is his only son. The remaining 1/3rd share was
settled on Vijay Kishan Bohra during his lifetime. It was
provided that it would go to his male children after his lifetime.
The said Vijay Kishan Bohra died, leaving behind his son
Chandrasekar Bohra. Vasantha Kumar (original 3rd defendant)
and his wife V. Sandhya (4th defendant) purchased the suit
property by a registered sale deed dated 29th January 2001
from the 2nd defendant – Sailesh Joshi, and the successors of
two other sharers who were entitled to 1/3rd share each under
the said deed of settlement. The 3rd defendant died during the
pendency of the proceedings, and the 5th defendant is the son
of the 3rd and 4th defendants.
4. Original Suit No. 12091 of 2010, as stated earlier, was
filed by the appellant/plaintiff. The suit was filed on 17th
November 1995, in which the plaintiff claimed that he was in
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open, uninterrupted and continuous possession of the suit
property for 45 years. He claimed that he had perfected his title
to the suit property by adverse possession along with his father
and other family members. In the plaint, it is stated that the
original owner died in 1947. The plaintiff relied upon several
documents to show his possession. As the defendants
threatened to dispossess him and trespass upon the suit
property, the suit was filed for a declaration that he had
become the owner of the suit property by adverse possession
and for permanent injunction.
5. The 2nd defendant contested the suit by contending that
the plaintiff was well aware of the said deed of settlement, but
he had not disclosed the same in the plaint. He submitted that
the three persons on whom the suit property was settled by the
original owner in the year 1945 became the owners of the suit
property on the demise of the original owner. The 4th and the
5th defendants also filed a written statement contending that
the plaintiff was in unlawful possession of a small portion of
the suit property to the extent of 250 sq. ft. The 4th and 5th
defendants denied the claim of adverse possession made by the
plaintiff.
6. Original Suit no. 12092 of 2010 was filed by the 3rd, 4th
and 5th defendants against the plaintiff. The suit was filed for
possession based on the title acquired by the 3rd, 4th and 5th
defendants on the basis of the sale deed dated 29th January
2001.
7. The 2nd defendant had filed a suit for eviction against the
tenants in the suit property, being EP No. 28 of 1996, in which
an order of eviction was passed. The plaintiff/appellant filed
Original Suit No. 973 of 1996, inter alia, for a declaration that
he was not bound by any order of eviction in EP No. 28 of 1996.
The City Civil Court dismissed Suit No. 12091 of 2010 filed by
the plaintiff and decreed Suit No. 12092 of 2010 filed by 3rd to
5th defendants and passed a decree for possession. Suit No. 973
of 1996, filed by the plaintiff, was decreed. Therefore, two
appeals were preferred by the plaintiff before the High Court for
challenging the decrees in the first two suits. The 2nd
defendant preferred an appeal against the decree passed in
Suit No. 973 of 1996. The appeal filed against the decree
passed in Suit No. 973 of 1996 was dismissed by the First
Appellate Court. However, the finding of the Trial Court that
the plaintiff had perfected his title by adverse possession was
set aside. The plaintiff filed a second appeal before the High
Court. By the impugned judgment dated 25th April 2014, the
High Court dismissed all three appeals preferred by the
plaintiff.
SUBMISSIONS
8. The learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant/original plaintiff submitted that what was executed
on 1st December 1945 by the original owner was a will. He
submitted that as the suit property is in Chennai, rights can
be claimed based on the will only if a probate or letters of
administration is obtained. The learned counsel submitted that
in the absence of probate or letters of administration, no right
could be claimed based on the so-called settlement deed dated
1st December 1945. Consequently, no right, title or interest in
the suit property has been passed on to the 3rd and 4th
defendants by the sale deed dated 29th January 2001. He
submitted that the continuous possession of the plaintiff is at
least from 1951, and on facts, the plaintiff had established the
plea of adverse possession. He submitted that the defendants
have no right concerning the suit property, and hence, the
impugned judgment is entirely erroneous. The learned counsel
appearing for the respondents supported the impugned
decision of the High Court.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
9. As far as the suit filed by the plaintiff for the declaration
of ownership based on adverse possession is concerned, the
plaintiff can never succeed unless he proves the plea of adverse
possession. There is a concurrent finding of fact on this issue
against the plaintiff.
10. As far as the plea of adverse possession is concerned, a
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M. Siddiq (Ram
Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das1
, in paragraph
1142 and 1143 has held thus:
“1142. A plea of adverse possession is
founded on the acceptance that ownership
of the property vests in another against
whom the claimant asserts a possession
1
(2020) 1 SCC 1
adverse to the title of the other. Possession
is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to
the acknowledged title in the other person
against whom it is claimed. Evidently,
therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit No. 4 ought
to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of
adverse possession against the Hindus or
the temple would amount to an acceptance
of a title in the latter. Dr Dhavan has
submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or
alternate plea upon which it is not
necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the
event that their main plea on title is held to
be established on evidence. It becomes
then necessary to assess as to whether the
claim of adverse possession has been
established.
1143. A person who sets up a plea of
adverse possession must establish both
possession which is peaceful, open and
continuous possession which meets the
requirement of being nec vi nec
claim and nec precario. To substantiate a
plea of adverse possession, the character of
the possession must be adequate in
continuity and in the public because the
possession has to be to the knowledge of
the true owner in order for it to be adverse.
These requirements have to be duly
established first by adequate pleadings and
second by leading sufficient evidence.
Evidence, it is well settled, can only be
adduced with reference to matters which
are pleaded in a civil suit and in the
absence of an adequate pleading, evidence
by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a
pleaded case. Reading Para 11(a), it
becomes evident that beyond stating that
the Muslims have been in long, exclusive
and continuous possession beginning from
the time when the Mosque was built and
until it was desecrated, no factual basis
has been furnished. This is not merely a
matter of details or evidence. A plea of
adverse possession seeks to defeat the
rights of the true owner and the law is not
readily accepting of such a case unless a
clear and cogent basis has been made out
in the pleadings and established in the
evidence.”
(underline supplied)
11. In the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of
India and Ors.2
, in paragraph 11, this Court has laid down
the law regarding the plea of adverse possession. Paragraph
11 reads thus:
“11. In the eye of the law, an owner would
be deemed to be in possession of a property
so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of
the property by the owner even for a long
time won’t affect his title. But the position
will be altered when another person takes
possession of the property and asserts a
right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile
possession by clearly asserting hostile title
in denial of the title of the true owner. It is
a well-settled principle that a party
claiming adverse possession must prove
that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec
precario”, that is, peaceful, open and
2
(2004) 10 SCC 779
continuous. The possession must be
adequate in continuity, in publicity and in
extent to show that their possession is
adverse to the true owner. It must start
with a wrongful disposition of the rightful
owner and be actual, visible, exclusive,
hostile and continued over the statutory
period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina [AIR
1964 SC 1254] , Parsinni v. Sukhi [(1993) 4
SCC 375] and D.N.
Venkatarayappa v. State of
Karnataka [(1997) 7 SCC 567] .) Physical
fact of exclusive possession and
the animus possidendi to hold as owner in
exclusion to the actual owner are the most
important factors that are to be accounted
in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse
possession is not a pure question of law
but a blended one of fact and law.
Therefore, a person who claims adverse
possession should show: (a) on what date
he came into possession, (b) what was the
nature of his possession, (c) whether the
factum of possession was known to the
other party, (d) how long his possession
has continued, and (e) his possession was
open and undisturbed. A person pleading
adverse possession has no equities in his
favour. Since he is trying to defeat the
rights of the true owner, it is for him to
clearly plead and establish all facts
necessary to establish his adverse
possession. [Mahesh Chand Sharma
(Dr.) v. Raj Kumari Sharma [(1996) 8 SCC
128]”
(underline supplied)
12. Therefore, to prove the plea of adverse possession :-
(a) The plaintiff must plead and prove that he was
claiming possession adverse to the true owner;
(b) The plaintiff must plead and establish that the factum
of his long and continuous possession was known to
the true owner;
(c) The plaintiff must also plead and establish when he
came into possession; and
(d) The plaintiff must establish that his possession was
open and undisturbed.
It is a settled law that by pleading adverse possession, a party
seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and therefore, there
is no equity in his favour. After all, the plea is based on
continuous wrongful possession for a period of more than 12
years. Therefore, the facts constituting the ingredients of
adverse possession must be pleaded and proved by the
plaintiff.
13. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the averments made
in Original Suit No. 12091 of 2010. A plea of adverse
possession can be found in paragraph 3 of the plaint, which
reads thus:
“3. The plaintiff is for the last 45 years in
open uninterrupted and continuous
possession and enjoyment of the premises
being land and building bearing Old Door
no. 14, New No. 18, Peria Neikaran Street,
Sowcarpet, Madras-600079, more fully
described in the schedule hereunder and
he has thus perfected his title by adverse
possession from before 1951, alongwith his
father, J. mangilal Radhakishen Joshi,
other members of his family. In proof
thereof, the plaintiff has filed several
documents to establish his said possession
adverse to the interests of anyone else
including the defendants. The said
documents may be treated as part and
parcel hereof. Several years prior to 1951,
the said property had been owned by on
Sukri Bai who died in or about 1947, she
died leaving no issues. The father of the
plaintiff and later the plaintiff have been
paying taxes only in her name. The
mutation in the Corporation and other
registries remain unchanged.”
(underline supplied)
As stated earlier, the suit was filed on 17th November 1995.
Therefore, going by the averments in paragraph 3 of the plaint,
the plaintiff can, at the highest, claim to be in possession from
the year 1950. In the same paragraph, the plaintiff stated that
the original owner died in 1947. It is not pleaded that even
before the year 1947, the plaintiff or his father were in hostile
possession to the knowledge of the original owner. When a
party claims adverse possession, he must know who the actual
owner of the property is. Secondly, he must plead that he was
in open and uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years
to the original owner’s knowledge. These material averments
are completely absent in the plaint. Therefore, there is no
proper foundation for the plea of adverse possession in the
plaint.
14. The Trial Court and the High Court have recorded
findings of fact on the plea of adverse possession. The High
Court has noted the admitted position that all along, the
property tax and water tax bills stood in the name of the
original owner. The High Court confirmed the finding of the
Trial Court that the plaintiff was not able to produce even a
single document to show that he had paid house tax before
1995. The High Court has referred to the Court
Commissioner’s Report, which records that the building
forming a part of the suit property was in a completely
dilapidated condition. The High Court has noted that the
plaintiff took no steps to repair the portion in the dilapidated
condition. The High Court has recorded a finding that water
tax and sewage tax were not paid for years together.
15. The High Court has referred to a complaint dated 25th
August 1995 submitted by the plaintiff to the police. In the
complaint, firstly, the plaintiff asserted that he was in
possession of only the front portion of the suit property.
Secondly, he specifically asserted that he had been in
possession of the suit property for 35 years before filing the
complaint. It is pointed out that this complaint was filed one
year before the institution of the suit. Thus, he claimed to have
been in possession since 1960. In the plaint, the plaintiff
claimed to have been in possession since 1950. The plaintiff’s
own complaint defeats the case made out in the plaint.
16. Therefore, the High Court held that the plaintiff could
not establish that his adverse possession commenced from a
particular date. The Trial Court and High Court rightly held
that the plaintiff failed to prove his plea of adverse possession.
In fact, as stated earlier, there was no foundation for the plea
of adverse possession in the plant itself. Therefore, the suit for
declaration of ownership by the plaintiff must fail. On one
hand, the plaintiff is claiming only on the basis of the plea of
the adverse possession. On the other hand, the defendants are
claiming through the person who was admittedly the original
owner. Even considering the failure to obtain probate or a
letter of administration, it is obvious that the defendants have
a better title to the suit property than the plaintiff, a
trespasser. Therefore, it is not possible to find fault with the
concurrent judgments recording a finding of fact that the
plaintiff failed to prove his adverse possession. Thus, the
appeals must fail.
17. During the submissions, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the
plaintiff is more than 80 years old. The plaintiff was in
possession of at least a part of the suit property almost from
1995. Therefore, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeals,
we propose to grant the plaintiff a longer time to vacate the
suit property.
18. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals with no orders as to
costs. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeals and
confirmation of the decree for possession against the plaintiff,
we direct that the decree of possession shall not be executed
till 31st March 2025, subject to the condition of the appellant
and all adult members of his family filing unconditional
undertakings on oath to vacate and handover the peaceful
possession of the suit property to the defendant nos. 4 and 5
(plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 10292 of 2010). The
undertakings on oath shall be filed within one month from
today. The advocate for the appellant shall provide copies of
the undertakings to the advocate for the respondents. On the
failure of the appellant and his adult family members to file
undertakings as above within the stipulated time, the decree
for possession shall forthwith become executable.
……………………..J.
(Abhay S. Oka)
……………………..J.
(Ujjal Bhuyan)
New Delhi;
March 18, 202